Evaluate the causes, consequences and lessons from the Cuban missile Essay

Evaluate the causes, consequences and lessons from the Cuban missile crisis - Essay vitrineIn response, the Kennedy administration found it necessary to reveal to Khrushchev that he had non made any quadrangle missiles. Khrushchev had always known the U.S. had more missiles but now he knew that the Americans knew. Khrushchev knew that Soviet missiles were sufficiently powerful to be launched against Europe but U.S. missiles were able to find all of the Soviet Union. (Article Think Quest, 2011) Moreover, Khrushchev felt boxed in the enemies. For example, he cited the U.S. missiles in Turkey, only 150 km away from the Soviet Union, Cuba was only 90 km from the coast of Florida, but the gap of 60 km was no anti-missile Khrushchev said. Above all, however, Khrushchev feared the first-class honours degree strike in on whether the Soviet Union lost the arms race so badly, he worried, call the first strike with nuclear weapons the United States because of Khrushchev began looking for a way to counter the United States, for example. (Article Think Quest, 2011) unrivaled of the main reasons was the fear of invasion of Cuba, the United States since he came to power in 1959, Cuban Premier Fidel Castro was alive(predicate) of certain United States is trying to move him. First there was the failed Bay of Pigs invasion by CIA-backed Cuban exiles in 1961. One was a U.S. military exercise in 1962. The armed forces in a farce comedy of an attack on a fictitious Caribbean island to overthrow the dictator, whose name was Castro Ortsac back. In addition, the United States was drawing up a plan to run over Cuba (Operation Mongoose). Mock attack and the attack plan was drawn up to turn back Castro nervous. Finally, the CIA was running covert operations throughout Cuba trying to damage the Castro government. So, Castro was convinced the United States was seriously invade Cuba. (Article Think Quest, 2011) In April 1962, designed the Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to the ide a of placing intermediate-range missiles in Cuba. Deployment in Cuba would double the Soviet strategic arsenal and provide a real deterrent to a possible U.S. attack against the Soviet Union or Cuba. Khrushchev promoted the KGB station chief in Cuba Alexander Alekseev to Ambassador to negotiate for Castros approval of the plan. Castro did not openly reject the idea at first, but instead he gave it serious. To believe it is better to riskiness a great crisis than wait helplessly for an invasion, Castro accepted Khrushchevs offer. In mid-July 1962 the USSR began its construction of offensive weapons in Cuba. The crisis could contrive and should ware been avoided. If we had done an earlier, stronger and more clearly explain our position regarding Soviet nuclear weapons on the westerly Hemisphere, or if the Soviet government was more thoroughly assessed the evidence existed at that point, it is likely that the missiles would never have been sent to Cuba. Importance of accurate asses sment of mutual interests between the two superpowers, are clear and consistent. current intelligence and allows the effective selection, the response was just the right time. It been mostly political mistakes, and professionals who have made a lot of intelligence is available in the past. But it was also a timely recognition of the film not fly to the bottom of the dangers that produced the decisive photographs. The need and extent of control from above, including the audit work of the Soviet missile withdrawal should not be underestimated. When the importance of accurate data crucial policy conclusion is high enough, otherwise